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This paper studies the free entry competitive equilibria of a labor managed
economy when there are less than complete contingent claims markets. First,
we prove the existence of a simple labor management equilibrium which is
inefficient in the Diamond sense. Second, we introduce an insurance system
internal to the firm and show that the resulting equilibrium exists and is Dia-
mond efficient. This insurance system plays for a labor managed economy the
same role as fixed obligation debt markets in an entrepreneurial stock market
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1. INTRODUCTION
The economic theory of labor management has clearly established the
equivalence of long-run labor management equilibria and competitive equi-
libria in models characterized by competitive behavior of all agents, com-
plete (non-labor) markets and free entry (see in particular Ward [1958],
Domar [1966], Vanek [1970], Dre`ze [1976], Ichiishi [1977], and Greenberg
[1979]]. As suggested by Dre`ze [1976], it is therefore appropriate to compare
the two systems on other grounds.
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This paper studies labor management under uncertainty when there are
less than complete contingent claims markets. Following the previous lit-
erature, we assume that workers receive a fixed share of the value added
generated by the firm at which they are employed. In an incomplete mar-
ket setting, this assumption can be interpreted as a constraint on the form
of the contingent claims allocations that can be exchanged. The constraint
is, in fact, closely related to that imposed by Diamond in his 1967 paper
on the stock market. In that paper, there are markets for firm shares and
for riskless debt. Thus the available contingent claims allocations are those
which can be constructed as a sum of riskless payments and shares of the
random outputs of firms. We will call contingent claims allocations which
have this structure Diamond feasible.
The first section introduces the formal model of the economic environ-
ment. This model is essentially the same as that studied in Kihlstrom-
Laffont [1982]. It differs from the earlier framework of that paper in only
one respect: there are two productive inputs, capital and labor, rather than
one. By employing this two-input model of the economic environment, we
are able to compare the economic outcomes of the worker-management sys-
tem with the outcomes generated by the capitalistic entrepreneurial stock
market economy studied in Kihlstrom-Laffont [1982]. We begin the analysis
in Section II by considering a labor-management system in which workers
receive only a fixed share, proportional to their labor supply, of the value
added of the single firm in which they work. The resulting equilibrium
is called a Simple Labor Management Equilibrium(SLME). It is formally
defined and shown to exist in that section. In an appendix, an example
is discussed in which the equilibrium exhibits an inefficiency in the sense
of Diamond that, in general, characterizes SLME. The problem arises be-
cause, in an SLME, although the sharing rule provides Diamond-feasible
allocations to labor managers, it does not permit the exchange of risks re-
quired for Diamond efficiency when workers have different degrees of risk
aversion. In a stock market economy, these exchanges are possible be-
cause of the existence of fixed obligation debt markets. In Section III, we
show that the same possibilities for risk trading can be incorporated in
a worker-management system by the introduction of an insurance system
internal to the firm. The resulting equilibrium is called a Labor Manage-
ment Equilibrium(LME) and is shown in an appendix to be equivalent to
an entrepreneurial stock market equilibrium. Using this equivalence, a la-
bor management equilibrium is shown to exist. The set of LME is also
shown to coincide with the core in the set of Diamond feasible allocations.
As a consequence, the LME is Diamond efficient.
It should be noted that the efficiency of the LME is attained even though
workers do not “diversify;” i.e. , they satisfy the constraint which limits
them to employment as worker-managers in only one firm. The imposition
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of this constraint creates a potential for inefficiency because it eliminates
some Diamond-feasible allocations from the set of contingent claims al-
locations available to worker-managers. This potential for inefficiency is
unrealized in the present analysis because of the strong assumption made
about the statistical dependence of the output of different firms. It is as-
sumed, in particular, that the same random factors influence the output of
all firms. As a result of this hypothesis, there is no need for diversification.
Thus workers, if given the option of diversifying by accepting employment
as worker-manages in more than one firm, would not find it advantageous to
exercise that option. If, however, the assumption of statistical dependence
of firms’ output were dropped, Diamond-efficient allocations would be char-
acterized by diversification. Thus labor management equilibria would be
efficient only if it were possible to be a labor-manager in several firms or if
labor-managed firms were diversified conglomerates.
By reversing the roles of capital and labor, our analysis can be reinter-
preted to yield a theory of capital management. The comparison between
capital and labor management in terms of Diamond efficiency is then re-
duced to a comparison of the costs of operating a riskless debt market in a
capitalist system with the costs of introducing internal insurance to a labor
management system.
2. THE BASIC MODEL
First, we describe the economic environment within which the alternative
economic systems to be considered will operate. Then we describe the main
institutional features of the labor management systems studied below.
2.1. THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
We consider an economy with three commodities, a consumption good
referred to as “income” and two production goods “labor” and “capital.”
The set of agents is represented by the continuum [0, 1],1 Although there
is a continuum of individuals, there is only a finite number, I, of types of
individuals. It will often be convenient to let I represent the set of agent
types {1, · · · , I} as well as the number of types. For i = 1, . . . , I, we will
let µi denote the Lebesgue measure of the set of type i individuals. We
must then have
∑
i∈I µi = 1.
A representative agent of type i is identified with his utility function ui(·)
and his vector of initial resource holdings (ωli, ωki, ωci) where
ωli = a type i individual’s initial labor allocation,
ωki = a type i individual’s initial capital allocation,
and
1Throughout the paper, we will avoid all trivial theoretical statements.
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ωci = a type i individual’s initial income allocation.
We will assume for simplicity that the sole argument of the utility function
is income .
The economy’s total endowments of the resources are denoted by
ωl =
∑
i∈I
µiωli,
ωk =
∑
i∈I
µiωki
and
ωc =
∑
i∈I
µiωci
Assumption 1.
a) ωci > 0; ωli > 0; ωki > 0; i = 1, . . . , I.
b) ui(·) strictly increasing and strictly concave on [0,+∞), i = 1, . . . , I.
A risky technology is available to any group of agents willing to pay a
set-up cost s in labor units. It is defined by a production function: g(k, l, x˜),
where
k is the amount of capital used,
l is the amount of labor used (in addition to s), and
x˜ is the random variable which is the same for any firm that uses the
technology.
Assumption 2.
a) x˜ takes its value in a finite set: x ∈ {x1, · · · , xs} = X.
b) There exists x ∈ X such that g(k, l, x) = 0, k ≥ 0, l ≥ 0.
c) g(0, l, x) = 0, l ≥ 0, x ∈ X;
g(k, 0, x) = 0, k ≥ 0, x ∈ X.
d) For all x ∈ X, g(·, ·, x) is continuous, increasing, and strictly concave
in (k, l) on the entire domain, [0,+∞)2.
e) For each x, the asymptotic cone of the production set defined by g
(with the set-up cost included) is {k, l + s, y : k ≥ 0, l ≥ 0, y = 0}.
2.2. THE BASIC INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Both types of labor-management systems considered below are assumed
to be characterized by certain common institutional features.
First there are no markets for contingent claims to the consumption
good. There is, however, a market in which capital is traded for riskless
debt. The price of capital is denominated in income terms and is denoted
by r. In order to guarantee that debt is, in fact, riskless, we want to avoid
the possibility of bankruptcy. Thus we make
Assumption 3.
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM IN A LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMY 189
An agent never makes a decision which could lead to bankruptcy with a
positive probability.
Worker-managed firms are, in essence, coalitions of workers who share
the proceeds of production. Each worker’s fractional share in the firm’s
value added is fixed before the firm’s output is known, i.e. before the value
taken by x is observed. A worker’s share is, furthermore, proportional to
the quantity of labor he supplies to the firm.
Firms created by coalitions are operated according to the wishes of the
coalition’s labor-managers. Any worker who disagrees with the actions
taken by a coalition is free to leave and join another coalition. If there is
no other existing coalition he would prefer to join, he is also free to attempt
to create a new coalition. The only cost of creating a coalition is the set-up
cost(s) of creating the firm(s) it will operate. Thus there is unlimited, but
costly, entry.
3. THE SIMPLE LABOR MANAGEMENT EQUILIBRIUM
The absence of labor markets is a basic feature of the systems to which
the term “labor management” is commonly applied. The present section
proceeds with this strict interpretation of labor management. In order to
simplify the current exposition, we also assume that each worker can supply
his labor to only one firm. As we show in Appendix A, however, even if
this assumption were dropped, it would be satisfied in equilibrium because
of the statistical dependence of firm outputs.
When the shares of value added received by a firm’s worker-managers
are proportional to the labor they supply to the firm, a worker of type i
will consume
ωli
s+ l
[g(k, l, x˜)− rk] + rωki + ωci (1)
if he is a worker-manager of a firm that employs k units of capital and l
units of labor.2
Consider now a worker-manager of type i. Since his consumption level is
given in (l), since his actions must not lead to any possibility of bankruptcy,
and since g(k, l, x) = 0 is always a possibility, an individual of type i will
2Note that, in (l), the worker’s share of value added exceeds one if ωli exceeds s+ l.
We want to permit such a situation. This will be possible if we introduce the possibility
of firms which are, in effect, holding companies or coalitions of smaller firms. Each
smaller firm is a branch of the coalition. We will permit these multiple branch coalitions
to form, but we will assume that if a coalition does create more than one branch, it will
choose to employ the same (k, l) in all of its branches. Because firm or branch outputs
are statisfically dependent, it would be satisfied in an equilibrium if it were not imposed.
We discuss this point in Appendix A.
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prefer to join a coalition which employs a (k, l) vector that maximizes
Eui
(
ωli
s+ l
[g(k, l, x˜)− rk] + rωki + ωci
)
(2)
subject to k ≥ 0, l ≥ 0, and the constraint
r
[
ωki −
(
ωli
s+ l
)
k
]
+ ωci ≥ 0. (3)
Let (ki, li) represent such a vector. A variation on the argument in Ap-
pendix A implies uniqueness of (ki, li). Coalitions which create firms that
employ the vector (ki, li) will be called type i coalitions. The firms they
create are type i firms. Individuals of type i will join coalitions of type i;
i.e., they will be worker-managers in these coalitions. Since there are µi
agents of type i each of whom supplies ωli labor units to a type i coalition,
the total supply of management labor to type i firms is µiωli. If there are νi
firms of type i, each of which employs li+s units of labor, the total demand
for management labor for type i firms will be νi(li + s). This demand will
equal the supply if there are
νi =
(
ωli
li + s
)
µi (4)
firms of type i. If, in addition,
∑
i∈I
νiki =
∑
i∈I
(
ωli
li + s
)
ki = ωk, (5)
there will also be equality of supply and demand in the capital market.
Having made these introductory remarks, we can now give the formal
definition of a Simple Labor-Managed Economy (SLME).
Definition 1 A Simple Labor-Managed Economy (SLME) is an interest
rate, r∗, and a capital labor allocation, (k∗i , l
∗
i ), for each type i ∈ I such
that
(i) for each i, (k∗i , l
∗
i ) maximizes (2) subject to (3), and
(ii) supply equals demand in the capital market in the sense that (5)
holds.
It should be noted that, because there is free entry in the sense that new
coalitions can always be formed, there can never be any equilibrium differ-
ent from those described in Definition l. Suppose, for example, that with r∗
equal to the capital price, a significant number of firms, say ν, attempted
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to form and employ a (k, l) vector not included in the set {(k∗i , l∗i )}i∈I . If
these firms are to operate, some labor-managers must be willing to supply
them with ν(s + l) labor units. But there will be no workers of any type
willing to supply labor to these firms. Instead, individuals of type i are free
to form coalitions which create firms that employ k∗i capital units and l
∗
i
labor units. In fact, ν∗ = µi(ωli/s+ l∗i ) will be created and will attract all
of the labor supplied by type i workers; none will remain for the firm em-
ploying (k, l). When there are ν∗i firms of type i, condition (5) guarantees
that total capital demands equal supplies.
We now state formally the theorem which establishes the existence of
SLME. The proof of this theorem is contained in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. Under A1, A2 and A3, there exists a SLME.
We can now ask whether the Simple Labor-Management Equilibria are
efficient in some appropriate sense. It should be immediately clear that the
institutional structure implicit in the definition of these equilibria is not
sufficiently rich to result in the attainment of first-best optima.
In spite of the fact that SLME fail to be efficient in a first-best sense,
they may have other desirable efficiency properties. For the purpose of
investigating this possibility, we follow the approach of Diamond. In his
study of the market for firm shares, Diamond effectively asked whether it
was possible for any system to use stock market institutions more efficiently
than the stock market itself used them. As discussed in the introduction,
Diamond imposes constraints on the contingent claims allocations under
consideration. Diamond-efficient allocations are those which are optimal
in this constrained set of contingent claims allocations. The constraints in-
troduced by Diamond go beyond the conditions that supply equal demand
imposed in complete contingent claims markets. They are intended to de-
scribe the institutional restrictions imposed on risk trading when exchanges
are made in fixed obligation debt markets and firm stock markets.
The definition given below will embody two further restrictions. The first
is that each individual invests in only one type of firm. The second is that
individuals of each type are equally treated. This second restriction can
be eliminated. It is used only to simplify the discussion. The first restric-
tion can also be added without cost, because of the assumption that the
same x˜ enters all production functions. When this assumption is satisfied,
allocations in only one type of firm Pareto dominate allocations in which
individuals holds shares in several types of firms. The argument used to
justify this remark is essentially the same as that outlined in Appendix A.
Definition 2 A Diamond-feasible allocation is a contingent consump-
tion vector (Ci(x))i∈I,x∈X and a vector (ki, li, ai, bi, νi)i∈I ∈ [0,+∞)3 ×
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[−ωci,+∞)× [0,+∞) such that
Ci(x) = aig(ki, li, x) + bi + ωci (6)
bi + ωci ≥ 0
νi = aiµi
∑
i∈I
µibi = 0 (7)∑
i∈I
νiki = ωk∑
i∈I
νi(li + s) = ωl
Definition 3 A Diamond-efficient allocation is a Diamond-feasible al-
location which is not Pareto dominated by any other Diamond-feasible
allocation.
Theorem 2. There exist SLME which are not Diamond efficient.
The example which establishes Theorem 2 is constructed in Appendix
D.3 Clearly the lack of Diamond efficiency is due to the fact that, regard-
less of his risk aversion or endowment, each agent must invest all of his
labor endowment in a risky firm. Formally, ai must equal ωli/(s + li),
because there exists no opportunity for the exchange of risk between work-
ers with different attitudes toward risk. In the next section, we consider
a labor-management system which makes such exchanges possible. Two
interpretations are given to this system. In the first, coalitions include
individuals of diverse types. The firm is interpreted as being composed
of divisions within which all individuals are of the same type. These di-
visions, in effect, trade insurance in exchange for labor services. In the
second interpretation, which is detailed in Appendix C, there are explicit
labor markets internal to each coalition. Divisions trade labor for a riskless
wage in these markets. Free entry guarantees that the wages of all of these
internal labor markets are equated. Thus the equilibrium is the same as
that which would result if the labor market were external.
3The example of Appendix D is also used to illustrate the equilibrium concepts defined
in the section which follows. For this reason, the reader is advised to consult this
appendix after reading Section 4.
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4. LABOR MANAGEMENT EQUILIBRIUM
Suppose that we now broaden the range of possibilities open to coalitions.
In particular, assume that these coalitions are composed of labor-managed
divisions which insure one another by exchanging non-random output pay-
ments for labor. Each individual will now be a worker-manager of one
division; he will supply all of his labor to that division and he will receive
a predetermined share of the value added generated by that division.
It is now possible for divisions to obtain labor from the internal insurance
market as well as from its labor managers. The labor obtained from its
managers will be called management labor. If a division employ s+ l total
labor units and receives δ of the units from other divisions, the management
labor employed by the division is s+ l− δ. A worker of type i who supplies
labor to such a division receives a share of output equal to
ωli
s+ l − δ
By varying the δ units of nonmanagement labor employed by this division,
the type i worker’s share can be varied; it is no longer fixed at
ωli
s+ l
as it was in the SLME. Suppose that a particular division employs k capital
units and l units of operating labor and that δ labor units are provided
by other divisions in return for a nonrandom insurance payment η. The
payment η is deducted from the value added in determining the output
generated by the division. Thus the output divided by the division’s worker
managers is
g(k, l, x)− rk − η,
when x˜ = x . The expected utility of a type i worker is
Eui
([
ωli
s+ l − δ
]
[g(k, l, x˜)− rk − η] + rωki + ωci
)
(8)
Assumption 3 requires that[
ωli
s+ l − δ
]
[−rk − η] + rωki + ωci ≥ 0. (9)
Now let (ki, li) be the input combination employed by divisions managed
by type i workers. Let δi be the nonmanagement labor employed by these
divisions and denote by ηi the insurance payment made by these divisions.
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If there are, in total, νi type i divisions, the demand for type i management
labor will be (s+ li − δi) . This demand will equal the supply, µiωli, if
νi =
µiωli
s+ li − δi . (10)
Supply and demand will be equated in the labor, capital, and insurance
markets respectively when∑
i∈I
νi(s+ li) = ωl, (11)∑
i∈I
νiki = ωk, (12)
and ∑
i∈I
νiηi = 0, (13)
Using (10) to substitute for νi in (11), (12), and (13), these equations
reduce to ∑
i∈I
µi
(
ωliδi
s+ li − δi
)
= 0, (14)
∑
i∈I
µi
(
ωliki
s+ li − δi
)
= ωk, (15)
and ∑
i∈I
µi
(
ωliηi
s+ li − δi
)
= 0. (16)
Each division’s choices can be reinterpreted to yield a relatively conve-
nient definition of equilibrium. Specifically, we can define new variables βi
and αi by
ωli + βi
s+ li
=
ωli
s+ li − δi (17)
and
αi = −
(
ωliηi
s+ li − δi
)
. (18)
Equation (17) can be solved for βi to yield
βi =
ωliδi
s+ li − δi . (19)
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When βi is negative, δi will be negative also. In this case, type i divisions
supply δi labor units to divisions of other types. The amount supplied
per type i worker is βi. The type i division receives the fixed payment −ηi
from the other divisions. The amount received per type i worker is αi. The
payment αi can be interpreted as an insurance payment to type i workers
for which they pay by supplying βi labor units. This insurance is supplied
by those divisions for which αi is negative and βi is positive. Since βi and
δi are positive for divisions which supply insurance, these firms employ
labor in amounts, s + li, which exceed their supply of management labor
s+ li − δi.
With this reformulation, the equilibrium conditions (11), (12), and (13)
are replaced by ∑
i∈I
µiβi = 0, (20)
∑
i∈I
µi
(
ωli + βi
s+ li
)
ki = ωk, (21)
and ∑
i∈I
µiαi = 0 (22)
respectively. The expressions (10) and (8) for νi and expected utility be-
come
νi = µi
(
ωli + βi
s+ li
)
. (23)
and
Eui
([
ωli + βi
s+ li
]
[g(ki, li, x˜)− rki] + αi + rωki + ωci
)
. (24)
The non-negativity restriction (9) becomes
r
(
ωki −
[
ωli + βi
s+ li
]
ki
)
+ αi + ωci ≥ 0. (25)
The description of the expanded concept of labor management equilib-
rium will be complete when we add the optimality conditions satisfied by
the equilibrium choice for (ki, li, βi, αi)i∈I to the supply equal demand con-
ditions (20), (21), and (22). The coalitions which exist in equilibrium must
make these optimal choices because of the possibility of free entry by new
coalitions. As in a SLME, if a coalition did not make the optimal choice,
new coalitions would form and offer the optimal choice. As a consequence,
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the coalitions making non-optimal choices could not attract management
labor. The formal definition of the equilibrium follows.
Definition 4 A Labor Management Equilibrium (LME) is an interest
rate r∗ and a vector (k∗i , l
∗
i , α
∗
i , β
∗
i , ν
∗
i )i∈I satisfying (20), (21), (22), and
(23) such that there exists no set (of strictly positive measure) of agents
T =
⋃
j∈J Tj formed as a union of subsets Tj of agents of types j ∈ J ⊆ I
and no alternative allocation (kj , lj , αj , βj , νj)j∈J for which (25) holds and
Euj
([
βj + ωlj
s+ lj
]
[g(kj , lj , x˜)− r∗kj ] + αj + r∗ωkj + ωcj
)
(26)
≥ Euj
([
βj + ωlj
s+ lj
]
[g(k∗j , l
∗
j , x˜)− r∗k∗j ] + α∗j + r∗ωkj + ωcj
)
for all j ∈ J with at least one strict inequality and for which
ωj = µ(Tj)
(
ωlj + βj
s+ lj
)
(27)∑
j∈J
αjµ(Tj) = 0 (28)
and ∑
j∈J
βjµ(Tj) = 0. (29)
We first prove that an LME exists. The proof is given in Appendix D,
where it is shown that an LME is equivalent to the Walrasian equilibrium
of an auxiliary exchange economy which is then shown to exist.
Theorem 3. Under (A1), (A2) and (A3), there exists an LME.
Next we establish the Diamond efficiency of the LME. In fact, we will
obtain a somewhat stronger result by proving that the set of LME coincides
with what will be referred to as the Diamond core. This is a second-best
concept of the core. It is defined analogously to the usual core concept.
That is, a definition of blocking by coalitions of individuals is introduced
and the core allocations are those which are unblocked. In defining the
Diamond core, the contingent claims allocations under consideration are
restricted to be Diamond feasible. Thus a coalition is permitted to block
with only reallocations of its own resources that are Diamond feasible for
the coalition. As in the discussion of Diamond efficiency, these restrictions
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM IN A LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMY 197
are imposed as a means of introducing the institutional restrictions inherent
in a stock market economy or a labor-management system. Therefore, it is
impossible, for any coalition of individuals to improve on a Diamond core
allocation using only stock market or labor management institutions.
We will now give a formal definition of the blocking concept and of the
core. In this formal discussion, a Diamond-feasible allocation
((Ci(x))x∈X , ki, li, ai, bi)i∈I will be identified with the imputation vector;
i.e. the vector of utilities
(ui = Eui(aig(ki, li, x˜) + bi + ωci))i∈I .
A coalition is a subset T =
⋃
j∈J Tj , where Tj is a subset of type j
individuals and J ⊆ I. A vector ((Ci(x))x∈X , kj , lj , bj , νj)j∈J is Diamond
feasible for coalition T if
Cj(x) = ajg(kj , lj , x) + bj + ωcj , (30)
bj + ωcj ≥ 0 (31)
and
νj = ajµ(Tj) (32)
for all j ∈ J and if ∑
j∈J
bjµ(Tj) = 0 (33)∑
j∈J
νjkj =
∑
j∈J
µ(Tj)ωkj (34)
and ∑
j∈J
νj(lj + s) =
∑
j∈J
µ(Tj)ωlj . (35)
Definition 5 A Diamond-feasible imputation vector (uj)i∈I is blocked
if there exists a coalition T and a vector ((Cj(x))x∈X , kj , lj , aj , bj , νj)j∈J
that is feasible for T such that
Euj (ajg(kj , lj , x˜) + bj + ωcj) ≥ uj (36)
for all j ∈ J and such that the strict inequality holds in (36) for some
j ∈ J .
Definition 6 A Diamond feasible allocation (or imputation) is in the
Diamond core if it is not blocked.
In Appendix C, we will prove the following result:
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Theorem 4. The set of LME coincides with the Diamond core.
Note that, since one possible blocking coalition is the coalition of the
whole, a Diamond core allocation is Diamond efficient. Thus as a corollary
of Theorem 4 we obtain the Diamond efficiency of an LME.
In the description of the LME, we have interpreted the exchange of sure
payments for labor between divisions as a form of insurance. Divisions
operated by risk averse workers obtain insurance by supplying labor for
use in other divisions rather than their own. If this labor were used in
their own division, these workers would bear the risks associated with its
employment. Because, however, their division receives a nonrandom output
transfer which they share, these risk averse workers are insured against the
risks associated with the use of the labor in the divisions to which it is
transferred.
This insurance scheme can also be interpreted as a labor market internal
to the firm in which ηi is the cost to the division i of employing the δi labor
units supplied by other divisions. The implicit wage paid by division i is
ηi/δi. Because of the free entry assumption which permits new coalitions to
form and because workers can freely leave one firm to join a new coalition,
this wage will be the same for all firms and for all divisions within each
firm. Thus, in an LME as in an economy with an external labor market,
all labor will be exchanged formally in Appendix D, where we define an
equilibrium in which a fixed wage labor market and labor management
co-exist. This hybrid system is introduced for two reasons. On the one
hand, it is useful as a step in the proof of existence and in demonstrating
the core equivalence theorem. On the other hand, in this equilibrium the
labor market plays the same role as the market for fixed obligation debt
in the Diamond stock market economy.4 Since, as we have just noted, the
external labor market could be viewed as a replacement for the internal
insurance system in a pure worker-management system, we can interpret
the insurance system as playing the same role in the labor management
economy as the bond market in a stock market economy.
APPENDIX A
We first outline the proof that an individual will never choose to supply
labor to two different firms in a SLME.
4In fact, by reversing the roles played by labor and capital, the labor management
system with a labor market can be interpreted as a capital management system with a
fixed obligation debt market in which the debt market is the analog of the fixed wage
labor market in the hybrid labor-management equilibrium.
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Consider a type i individual who suppliesm labor units to a firm employ-
ing (k, l) and mˆ = ωli−m labor units to a firm that employs (kˆ, lˆ) 6= (k, l).
When x˜ = x, this individual will receive(
m
s+ l
)
[g(k, l, x)− rk] +
(
mˆ
s+ lˆ
)
[g(kˆ, lˆ, x)− rkˆ] (A.1)
consumption good units from these firms. When x 6= x, g is strictly concave
and the amount in (A.l) is exceeded by(
m
s+ l
+
mˆ
s+ lˆ
)
[g(k, l, x)− rk] =
(
ωli
s+ lˆ
)
[g(k, l, x)− rk], (A.2)
where
(k, l) =
(
m
s+ l
)
(k, l) +
(
mˆ
s+ lˆ
)
(kˆ, lˆ)(
m
s+ l
)
+
(
mˆ
s+ lˆ
)
If x˜ = x, the amounts in (A.1) and (A.2) are equal. Thus a labor-manager
of type i who supplies labor to a single firm employing (k, l) always does
at least as well as he would if he were to divide his time between two firms
employing (k, l) and (kˆ, lˆ).
For similar reasons, individuals will always prefer to be part of a coali-
tion whose firms all employ the same input combinations. Suppose to the
contrary that a coalition created ν firms which employed (k, l) and νˆ firms
which employed (kˆ, lˆ). As a member of this coalition, a type i individual
would receive
ωli
ν(s+ l) + ν˜(s+ lˆ)
{
ν[g(k, l, x)− rk] + νˆ[g(kˆ, lˆ, x)− rkˆ]
}
(A.3)
if x˜ = x. If instead this coalition used the same amount of labor to create
(ν + νˆ) firms each employing
(k, l) =
ν(k, l) + νˆ(kˆ, lˆ)
ν + νˆ
,
the type i labor-manager would receive
ωli
ν(s+ l) + νˆ(s+ lˆ)
{
(ν + νˆ)[g(k, l, x)− rk]} = ωli
s+ lˆ
[g(k, l, x)− rk] (A.4)
if x˜ = x. When x˜ = x, the amounts in (A.3) and (A.4) are equal. In all
other cases, (A.4) exceeds (A.3). Thus the type i workers prefer to join a
coalition whose (ν + νˆ) firms all employ (k, l) in preference to one which
has ν firms employing (k, l) and νˆ firms employing (kˆ, lˆ).
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APPENDIX B
Proof of the existence of a SLME (Theorem l):
We reduce the SLME existence problem to a more familiar problem;
viz., one of finding a Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy. To
accomplish this translation of the problem, we first define
ξi =
ωli
s+ li
ki
so that
ξi
ki
=
ωli
s+ li
and
li =
ki
ξi
ωli − s.
We then note that the problem of finding an SLME is equivalent to one of
finding a vector 〈r, (ξi, ki)i∈I〉 such that, for each i ∈ I, (ξi, ki) maximizes
Eui
(
ξi
g(ki, (ki/ξi)ωli − s, x˜)
ki
+ r[ωki − ξi] + ωci
)
(B.1)
subject to non-negativity constraints on ξi and ki and subject to
r[ωki − ξi] + ωci ≥ 0, (B.2)
and such that ∑
i∈I
µiξi = ωk. (B.3)
This problem is translated into the problem of finding the Walrasian
equilibrium of a two-good exchange economy by defining
ζi = r[ωki − ξi] + ωci (B.4)
and
νi(ξi, ζi) = max
ki≥0
Eui
(
ξi
g(ki, (ki/ξi)ωli − s, x˜)
ki
+ ζi
)
. (B.5)
From (Al), (A2), and (A3), we can derive the existence and the continuity
of the function Vi on [0,+∞)2.
The exchange economy considered is one in which there are µi type i
individuals and in which a type i individual begins with the initial endow-
ment (ξi, ζi) = (ωki, ωci) and maximizes the utility function Vi defined in
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(B.5). When we interpret ζi as the numeraire and let r be the price of
ξi, equation (B.4) becomes the budget constraint subject to which Vi is
maximized in the Walrasian equilibrium. Solving the problem of choosing
(ξi, ζi) ∈ [0,+∞)2 to maximize Vi subject to (B.4) is in fact equivalent to
finding a (ξi, ki) ∈ [0,+∞)2, which maximizes (B.1) subject to (B.2). The
Walrasian requirement that supply and demand for ξ be equated is simply
(B.3). Taken together, the observations just made imply that a Walrasian
equilibrium 〈r, (ξi, ζi)〉i∈I for the exchange economy yields an LME. The
proof of existence of the Walrasian equilibrium is now accomplished using
standard techniques as described, for example, in Aumann [1966]. The
singlevaluedness of the demand functions is obtained from the uniqueness
of the maximizing input vectors (ki, li) derived by arguments like those in
Appendix A. Continuity of demand functions follows then from (A1)-(A2).
APPENDIX C
We begin by defining three auxilliary concepts which are useful in estab-
lishing the existence and core equivalence theorems for LME. The first of
these concepts is the labor-management equilibrium with an external labor
market, in which workers are paid a nonrandom wage (LMEFW). These
are the equilibria referred to in the concluding section. The other concepts
are the Walrasian equilibria (WE) and the Core (EE Core) of an appro-
priately defined exchange economy. The structure of the argument used
to establish the existence and core equivalence is described in the diagram
below.
LMEFW ⊂(1) LME
(2) |‖
WE ∩(5)
(3) |‖
EE Core ≡(4) Diamond Core
In this diagram, ≡ means is identical to.
Step (1) consists of showing that an LMEFW is an LME.
Step (2) identifies the set of LMEFW and the set of WE and demon-
strates that these sets are non-empty.
Step (3) is Aumann’s core equivalence theorem.
Step (4) establishes the equivalence of the exchange economy core and
the Diamond core.
Step (5) shows that an LME belongs to the Diamond core implying, in
combination with the other steps, that LME Diamond core.
STEP 1
We begin by defining the LMEFW. In a labor-managed economy with
an external labor market workers may spend only a part, mi, of their time
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working as labor managers. The remainder of their time ωli−mi can then
be supplied for a fixed wage which we denote by w. When a type i worker
supplies mi units of management-labor to a firm employing ki capital units
and li labor units, all of which is supplied by labor managers, his share of
value added is mis+li and his wealth is
mi
s+ li
[g(ki, li, x)− rki] + rωki + w(ωli −mi) + ωci (C.1)
when x˜ = x.
Suppose then that (k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i ) maximizes
Eui
(
mi
s+ li
[g(ki, li, x˜)− rki] + rωki + w(ωli −mi) + ωci
)
, (C.2)
subject to
r
[
ωki −
(
mi
s+ li
)
ki
]
+ w(ωli −mi) + ωci ≥ 0. (C.3)
Type i individuals will supply m∗i units of management labor to firms
employing (k∗i , l
∗
i ), i.e. to type i firms. The supply of and demand for
management labor for type i firms will be equated when there are
ν∗i =
µim
∗
i
s+ l∗i
(C.4)
of these firms. The equilibrium wage level and capital price will be such that
the corresponding (ν∗i , k
∗
i , l
∗
i )i∈I results in equality of supply and demand
for capital and labor.
Definition C.1. A Labor Management Equilibrium with a Fixed
Wage Labor Market (LMEFW) is an interest rate, wage vector (r∗, w∗),
and a vector (k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i , ν
∗
i )i∈I such that
i) for each i ∈ I, (k∗i , l∗i ,m∗i ) maximizes (C.2) subject to (C.3) when
w = w∗ and r = r∗,
ii) ν∗i ,m
∗
i , and l
∗
i satisfy (B.4), and
iii) the supply equal demand conditions (11) and (12) hold.
Using an argument analogous to the standard proof that a Walrasian
equilibrium is in the core, it can easily be shown that a LMEFW is a LME.
We state this formally in the following proposition.
Proposition C.1. If 〈r∗, w∗, (k∗i , l∗i ,m∗i , ν∗i )i∈I〉 is an LMEFW, then
〈r∗, (k∗i , l∗i , α∗i , β∗i , ν∗i )i∈I〉 is an LME when α∗i and β∗i are defined by
α∗i = w
∗[ωli −m∗i ] (C.5)
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and
β∗i = m
∗
i − ωli. (C.6)
Proof. Suppose that 〈r∗, w∗, (k∗i , l∗i ,m∗i , ν∗i )i∈I〉 is an LMEFW. Define
α∗i , β
∗
i by (C.5) and (C.6). Now suppose that there exists a coalition T =⋃
j∈J Tj and a vector (kj , lj , αj , βj , νj)j∈J such that (26) holds for all j ∈ J ,
with a strict inequality for some j ∈ J . Using (C.5), (C.6) and the fact
that (k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i ) maximizes (C.2) subject to (A3.3), we obtain
Euj
[(
β∗j + ωlj
s+ l∗j
)
[g(k∗j , l
∗
j , x˜)− rk∗j ] + α∗j + r∗ωkj + ωcj
]
(C.7)
= Euj
[(
m∗j
s+ l∗j
)
[g(k∗j , l
∗
j , x˜− rk∗j ] + w∗[ωlj −m∗j ] + r∗ωkj + ωcj
]
≥ Euj
[(
mj
s+ lj
)
[g(kj , lj , x˜)− rkj ] + w∗[ωlj −mj ] + r∗ωkj + ωcj
]
where
mj = βj + ωlj . (C.8)
When we use (C.8) to substitute for mj in the right side of (C.7) and
then combine the resulting inequality with (26), the result is
Euj
[(
βj + ωlj
s+ lj
)
[g(kj , lj , x˜)− rkj ] + αj + r∗ωkj + ωcj
]
(C.9)
≥ Euj
[(
βj + ωlj
s+ lj
)
[g(kj , lj , x˜)− rkj ]− w∗βj + r∗ωki + ωcj
]
.
This inequality holds for all j ∈ J , and for at least one j ∈ J it holds with
a strict inequality. Thus, for all j ∈ J ,
αj ≥ −w∗βj
and the inequality is strict for some j ∈ J . As a consequence,
−
∑
j∈J
αjµ(Tj) < w∗
∑
j∈J
βjµ(Tj). (C.10)
Inequality (C.10) implies that the conditions (28) and (29) cannot hold
simultaneously. Thus (kj , lj , αj , βj , νj) cannot satisfy (28) and (29) when
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(C.10) holds for all j ∈ J with a strict inequality for some j ∈ J . The vector
r∗, (k∗i , l
∗
i , α
∗
i , β
∗
i , ν
∗
i )i∈I must therefore be an LME.
The interpretation of an LMEFW as defined is somewhat strained when
mi exceeds ωli. In this case, type i workers in effect hire workers of other
types to work, on behalf of the type i individuals, as labor-managers in
a type i firm. It seems unlikely that such arrangements will be observed
in an explicit form. There is, however, a version of the Modigliani-Miller
theorem which can be established for LMEFW and which can be used to
yield conveniently interpretable equilibria equivalent to LMEFW.
For the purpose of discussing this issue, suppose that firms hire labor
directly at the wage w. Let φi be the amount of labor hired by type i
firms. The Modigliani-Miller theorem referred to above asserts that the
choice of φi is irrelevant. Specifically a change in φi can be compensated
for by changing mi so as to leave income unchanged in all states x ∈ X.
Suppose, for example, that we start with a situation in which φi = 0 and
(ki, li,mi) = (k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i ). If we now let φi = φi, where φi is an arbitrarily
chosen non-zero amount, we can compensate for this change in φi from zero
to φi by changing mi to
mi =
[
m∗i
s+ l∗i
]
[s+ l∗i − φi].
It is easily verified that, for each x ∈ X,[
mi
s+ l∗i − φi
]
[g(k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i )− rk∗i − wφi] + rωki + w[ωli −mi] + ωci
=
[
m∗i
s+ l∗i
]
[g(k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i )− rk∗i ] + rωki + w[ωli −m∗i ] + ωci.
Thus, for each state x ∈ X, a type i individual receives the same amount
of income when (φi,mi) = (φi,mi) as he does when (φi,mi) = (φ∗i ,m
∗
i ).
As a consequence of the result just proved, the opportunity to choose
φi is of no value and can be ignored as we have done in the preceeding
discussion. The irrelevance of φi can, however, be exploited to provide a
more convenient interpretation of the LMFW. In particular, we can assume
that mi always equals ωli and that firms hire φ∗i labor units where φ
∗
i is
such that
m∗i
s+ l∗i
=
ωli
s+ l∗i − φ∗i
. (C.11)
In (C.11), the starred values for m∗i and φ
∗
i are the LMEFW values, i.e.
the equilibrium values when φi = 0 when we use this approach, it is never
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necessary for type i individuals to employ other laborers to work as man-
agers on their behalf. All hiring in the labor market is done explicitly by
the firms.
At this stage, it should be noted that, in defining the economic environ-
ment, the only asymmetry in the roles played by capital and labor arises
because fixed costs are borne in the form of labor. When there are markets
for both inputs in which payments to suppliers are nonrandom obligations,
this asymmetry in the economic environment does not give a managerial
advantage to the suppliers of either input. Thus, in the above definition,
the roles of capital and labor can be reversed to obtain a definition of capital
management with a fixed obligation debt market. The set of these capital
management equilibria can be shown to coincide with the (LMEFW). We
will not formally perform this exercise, but we will outline the argument.
Suppose then that we begin with a LMEFW 〈r∗, w∗, (k∗i , l∗i ,m∗i , ν∗i )i∈I〉.
To define an equivalent capital management equilibrium, we let n∗i repre-
sent the amount of management capital supplied by a type i individual. To
insure that these individuals receive the same output share as they would
in the LMEFW, it must be the case that
n∗i = k
∗
i
m∗i
s+ l∗i
. (C.12)
when (C.12) is satisfied, i’s income is easily seen to equal
n∗i
k∗i
[g(k∗i , l
∗
i , x)− w(l∗i + s)] + r[ωki − n∗i ] + wωli + ωci (C.13)
when x˜ = x. Furthermore, (k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i ) maximizes the expected utility (C.2)
subject to (C.3) if and only if (k∗i , l
∗
i ,m
∗
i ) maximizes the expected type
i utility of (C.13) subject to the appropriate analog of inequality (C.3).
When n∗i satisfies (C.12), ν
∗
i is still given by (C.4), and the supply equal
demand conditions are therefore still satisfied.
The argument just outlined establishes the equivalence of labor and cap-
ital management. Capital management equilibrium can also be identified
with the stock market equilibria of Kihlstrom-Laffont [1982]. This identi-
fication is achieved by interpreting
γi =
ni
ki
(C.14)
as the share of a type i firm held by a type i individual. The choice of
(ki, li, ni) can then be shown to be equivalent to the choice of (ki, li, γi) .
when γi and ni are related by (C.14), the stock market equilibrium and
capital management equilibrium result in the same number of firms of each
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type and the equality of input supplies and demands in a stock market
equilibrium is equivalent to equality of these supplies and demands in the
capital market. In making the translation to the stock market equilibrium,
it is assumed that s is the price in labor terms of a full share in a firm
which employs k capital units and l labor units and finances these input
purchases entire1y with debt.Thus the labor value of the firm is the labor
cost of creating it. It is argued in Kihlstrom-Laffont[1982] that this as-
sumption about the share price of a firm can be justified as a form of the
rational expectations hypothesis. There may be other stock market equi-
libria in which the price of shares in some firms not observed in equilibrium
is below s, the cost of creating these firms. These “non-rational expecta-
tions” equilibria can never be capital management or labor management
equilibria, however. Thus the capital and labor management equilibria dis-
cussed in this section will yield only those stock market equilibria in which
expectations about firm share prices are rational
STEP 2
We can now identify the LMEFW with the Walrasian equilibria of an
appropriately defined pure trade economy.
This pure trade economy also has I types of individuals who will now
be interpreted as consumers of three commodities. Again there are µi
consumers of type i. The amounts of the commodities consumed by type i
consumers are denoted by mi, ξi and ζi. At this point, the utility function
of a type i consumer is simply denoted by Vi and is assumed to have domain
[0,+∞)3. Vi will be related to ui below. The initial endowment of a type
i consumer is the vector (mi, ξi, ζi) = (ωli, ωki, ωci), where ωli, ωki and ωci
are as defined in the specification of the economic environment in Section
2. Summarizing, the pure trade economy is formally represented by the
vector 〈Vi, (ωli, ωki, ωci), µi〉)i∈I .
In defining the Walrasian equilibrium of this pure trade economy, ζ is in-
terpreted as the numeraire. The wage w and interest rate r of an LMEFW
are now interpreted as the Walrasian prices of commodities m and ξ re-
spectively.
Definition C.2. A Walrasian equilibrium of the pure trade economy
〈Vi, (ωli, ωki, ωci), µi〉i∈I is a vector 〈(m∗i , ξ∗i , ζ∗i )i∈I , w∗, r∗〉 such that
i) (m∗i , ξ
∗
i , ζ
∗
i ) maximizes Vi on [0,+∞)3 subject to the budget constraint
ζi + wmi + rξi = ωci + wωli + rωki, (C.15)
and
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ii) supplies equal demands in all markets; i.e.∑
i∈I
µiζi = ωc, (C.16)∑
i∈I
µimi = ωl, (C.17)
and ∑
i∈I
µiξi = ωk. (C.18)
An LMEFW can now be translated into a Walrasian equi1ibrium. We
first identify the mi in a LMEFW with the same variable in the pure trade
economy. The ξi and ζi are then related to the variables in the LMEFW
by the equations
ξi = mi
(
ki
s+ li
)
(C.19)
and
ζi = r(ωki − ξi) + w(ωli −mi) + ωci. (C.20)
Note that (C.20) is simply a rearrangement of the budget constraint (C.15).
Also note that (C.19) can be inverted to obtain an expression for li. Specif-
ically,
li =
miki
ξi
− s. (C.21)
We now define Vi by letting
Vi(mi, ξi, ζi) = max
ki≥0
Eui
ζi + ξi
g
(
ki,
mi
ξi
ki − s, x˜
)
ki
 (C.22)
The fact that Vi is well-defined and continuous on [0,+∞)3 follows from
(Al),(A2), and (A3).
Using the expressions for li, ξi and ζi given in (C. 21), (C.19), and (C.
20), it is easily demonstrated that the problem of choosing (ki, li,mi) to
maximize (C.2) subject to (C.3) is equivalent to choosing (mi, ξi, αi) ∈
[0,+∞)3 to maximize Vi subject to the budget constraint (C.15). We
complete the translation from a LMEFW by noting that the conditions (11)
and (12) requiring no excess demands in the input markets are equivalent to
the conditions (C.l7) and (C.18) equatingm and ξ supplies and demands in
the Walrasian equilibrium. Walras’ law guarantees the equality of demand
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and supply in the ζ market. In making the translation to (C.17) and
(C.18),it must be recalled that the νi’s in (11) and (12) are defined by
(C.4).
The existence of an LMEFW and, in view of proposition 1,of an LME
will be established if we can demonstrate the existence of a Walrasian
equilibrium of the pure trade economy. The proof is easily derived from
Aumann [1966l.
STEP 3
From Aumann [1964], we know that the set of Walrasian equilibria of
the exchange economy coincides with the core of the exchange economy.
STEP 4
We now show that the core of the exchange economy coincides with the
Diamond core.
Let T =
⋃
j∈J Tj be a coalition. A consumption vector (mj , ξj , ζj)j∈J ∈
[0,+∞)3 is feasible in the exchange economy for this coalition if it satisfies∑
j∈J
(ζj − ωlj)µ(Tj) = 0, (C.23)∑
j∈J
(mj − ωlj)µ(Tj) = 0 (C.24)
and ∑
j∈J
(ξj − ωkl)µ(Tj) = 0 (C.25)
As in the discussion of the Diamond core, we identify the consumption
vector (mj , ξj , ζj)j∈J with the imputation vector
(uj = Vj(mj , ξj , ζj))j∈J .
Thus we will sometimes refer to an imputation vector (uj)j∈J as being
feasible for T . When T is the coalition of the whole, (C.23), (C.24) and
(C.25) become (C.16), (C.17) and (C.18). We denote by EF the set of con-
sumption vectors or imputation vectors which are feasible for the coalition
of the whole.
An allocation, equivalently an imputation vector (ui)i∈I , in EF is blocked
by a coalition T =
⋃
j∈J Tj if there exists a consumption vector (mj , ξj , ζj)j∈J
feasible for T such that
Vj(mj , ξj , ζj) ≥ uj
for all j ∈ J with a strict inequality for at least one j ∈ J .
An allocation or imputation vector in EF is in the exchange economy
core if it is not blocked by any coalition of positive measure.
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Proposition C.2. The Diamond core and the exchange economy core
coincide.
This proposition is an immediate corollary of the following lemma which
applies to any coalition T =
⋃
j∈J Tj
Lemma C.1. If (uj)j∈J is an imputation vector that is Diamond-feasible
for T , then there exists an imputation (u′j)j∈J that is feasible for T in the
exchange economy and that Pareto dominates or is Pareto indifferent to
(uj)j∈J . Similarly, if (uj)j∈J is feasible for T in the exchange economy, it
is also Diamond-feasible for T .
Proof. If (uj)j∈J is Diamond-feasible for T =
⋃
j∈J Tj , then
uj = Euj(ajg(kj , lj , x˜) + bj + ωcj) (C.26)
where ((Cj(x))x∈X(kj , lj , aj , bj , νj))j∈J is Diamond-feasible for T . We can
then define (mj , ξj , ζj) by
ζj = bj + ωcj , (C.27)
ξj = ajkj , (C.28)
and
mj = (lj + s)(ξj/kj). (C.29)
Substituting these expressions in (C.26), we can write
uj = Euj
(
ζj + ξj
(
g(kj , (mj/ξj)kj − s, x˜)
kj
))
≤ max
kj≥0
Euj
(
ζj + ξj
(
g(kj , (mj/ξj)kj − s, x˜)
kj
))
= Vj(mj , ξj , ζj).
The vector (mj , ξj , ζj) defined by (C.29), (C.28) and (C.27) is feasible for
T in the exchange economy since (C.23), (C.24), and (C.25) are implied
by (33), (34) and (35) when νj satisfies (32). Thus (Vj(mj , ξj , ζj))j∈J is
an imputation vector which is Pareto superior or indifferent to (uj)j∈J and
which is feasible for T in the exchange economy.
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When (uj)j∈J is feasible for T in the exchange economy, we let kj be
such that
Euj
(
ζj + ξj
(
gj(kj , (mj/ξj)kj − s, x)
kj
))
= max
kj≥0
Euj
(
ζj + ξj
(
gj(kj , (mj/ξj)kj − s, x)
kj
))
= uj
and then define lj , aj and bj by
lj = (mj/ξj)kj − s,
aj = ξj/kj ,
and
bj = ζj − ωcj .
The vector (kj , lj , aj , bj , νj) defined in this way yields an allocation which is
Diamond-feasible for T since (C.23), (C.24) and (C.25) imply (33), (34) and
(35) when νj satisfies (32). Thus (uj)j∈J is also Diamond-feasible for T .
STEP 5
Proposition C.3. An LME is in the Diamond core.
Proof. Suppose that 〈r∗, (k∗i , l∗i , α∗i , β∗i , ν∗i )i∈I〉 is an LME. Define a∗i , b∗i
by
a∗i =
β∗i + ωli
s+ l∗i
(C.30)
and
b∗i = α
∗
i + r
∗
[
ωki −
(
β∗i + ωli
s+ l∗i
)
k∗i
]
. (C.31)
Now assume that the Diamond-feasible allocation associated with (k∗i , l
∗
i , a
∗
i , b
∗
i , ν
∗
i )
is not in the Diamond core; i.e., assume that there is a coalition T =⋃
j∈J Tj and a ((Cj(x))x∈X , kj , lj , aj , bj , νj)j∈J feasible for T , such that
Euj(ajg(kj , lj , x˜) + bj + ωcj) (C.32)
≥ Euj(a∗jg(kj , lj , x˜) + b∗j + ωcj)
= Euj
([
β∗j + ωlj
s+ l∗j
]
[g(k∗j , l
∗
j , x˜)− rk∗j ] + α∗j + rωkj + ωcj
)
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holds for all j ∈ J and such that the inequality (C.32) is strict for some
j ∈ J .
We now define βj and αj by
βj = aj [s+ lj ]− ωlj (C.33)
and
αj = bj − r∗[ωkj − ajkj ]. (C.34)
The fact that (C.32) holds for all j ∈ J implies that (26) holds for all j ∈ J .
For the j at which the inequality (C.32) is strict, the inequality (26) is also
strict. The fact that (kj , lj , aj , bj)j∈J is feasible for T means that the in-
equalities (33), (34) and (35) hold when νj satisfies (32). These inequalities
imply (27), (28) and (29) when βj and αj are related to (kj , lj , aj , bj) by
(C.33) and (C.34). As a consequence, r∗, (k∗j , l
∗
j , α
∗
j , β
∗
j , ν
∗
j )j∈J cannot be an
LME as originally assumed.
APPENDIX D
Example of a Diamond-inefficient SLME:
We provide an example which illustrates the equilibrium notions defined
above and which shows why an SLME may fail to be Diamond-efficient.
Technology: g(k, l, x˜) = h(k, l)x˜, where
h(k, l) = kδlσ, with δ + σ < 1 and δ > 0, σ > 0. (D.1)
Utility functions:
ui(c) = −e−ρic ρi > 0. (D.2)
LME and LMEFW:
We consider the LMEFW. The first-order conditions satisfied by the
(ki, li,mi) vector which maximizes
Eui
(
mi
h(ki, li)x˜− rki
s+ li
+ w(ωli −mi) + rωki + ωci
)
are
Eu′i(·)[hkx˜− r] = 0 (D.3)
Eu′i(·)[hlx˜− w] = 0 (D.4)
and
Eu′i(·)x˜[h− hkki − hl(li + s)] = 0. (D.5)
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Combining (D.3) and (D.4) yields
δli
σki
=
hk
hl
=
r
w
. (D.6)
(D.5) reduces to
h− hkki − hl(li + s) = 0, (D.7)
which can be further simplified when (D.1) holds. The result is
h
[
1− δ − σ
(
1 +
s
li
)]
= 0, (D.8)
which implies that
li =
σs
[1− (δ + σ)] . (D.9)
Equation (D.9) implies that li is independent of i. If we now let ν be the
total number of firms, the requirement that supply equal demand in the
labor market combines with (D.9) to imply that
ν
{
s+
σs
[1− (δ + σ)]
}
= ωl. (D.10)
When solved for ν, (D.10) becomes
ν =
ωl[1− (δ + σ)]
(1− δ)s . (D.11)
Since li is independent of i , (D.6) implies that ki is also. The fact
that all firms choose to employ the same amounts of capital and labor
is a consequence of the fact that there are stochastic constant returns to
scale because g(k, l, x) = h(k, l)x. This is an example of the well-known
“unanimity” theorem of Ekern-Wilson [1974], Leland [1974] and Radner
[1974]. The requirement that supply equal demand in the capital market
implies that ki = k, where k satisfies
νk = ωk =
∑
i∈I
ωkiµi. (D.12)
when (D.11), the expression for ν, is substituted in (D.12), the result is the
following expression for k:
k =
[
ωk
ωl
] [
(1− δ)s
[1− (δ + σ)]
]
(D.13)
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To obtain an expression for r/w, we first use (D.9) and (D.13) to obtain
the following expression for l/k:
l/k = ωl/ωk
(
δ
1− δ
)
. (D.14)
When (D.14) is substituted in (D.6), the result is the desired expression
for r/w. Specifically,
r/w =
ωl
ωk
(
δ
1− δ
)
. (D.15)
Up to this point, we have determined the equilibrium values for l, v, k
and r/w in equations (D.9), (D.11), (D.l3), and (D.15) respectively. We
can now compute mi as well as the equilibrium price of capital, r. First
note that, because (D.3) holds for all i,
hk
Eu′i(·)x˜
Eu′i(·)
= r = hk
Eu′1(·)x˜
Eu′1(·)
(D.16)
must hold for all i. When (D.2) is used in (D.16), the result is
hk
Ex˜e−ρimi(
kδlσ
s+l )x˜
Ee−ρimi(
kδlσ
s+l )x˜
= r = hk
Ex˜e−ρ1m1(
kδlσ
s+l )x˜
Ee−ρ1m1(
kδlσ
s+l )x˜
(D.17)
where l and k are given by (D.9) and (D.13) respectively.
Condition (D.17) will hold if
mi =
ρ1
ρi
m1 (D.18)
for all i. Furthermore, in equilibrium the mi’s must satisfy
ωl = ν(s+ l) =
∑
i∈I
µimi. (D.19)
When (D.18), the expression for mi, is substituted in (D.19) the result is
an expression for m1 which, because of (D.18), also yields an expression
for mi. Specifically, (D.18) and (D.l9) imply that, for all i,
mi = (1/ρi)ωlρ (D.20)
where
ρ =
[∑
t∈I
µt(1/ρt)
]−1
(D.21)
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is a measure of average risk aversion. Substituting (D.2O) in (D.17) yields
the following expression for r
r = δkδ−1lσ
Ex˜e−ωlρ(
kδlσ
s+l )x˜
Ee−ωlρ(
kδlσ
s+l )x˜
(D.22)
This completes the description of the LME in this case.
SLME:
In this case, (ki, li) are chosen to maximize
Eui
(
ωli
[
h(ki, li)x˜− rki
s+ li
]
+ rωki + ωci
)
.
The first-order conditions satisfied by the optimal (ki, li) choice are (D.3)
and (D.5). Recall that these are also first-order conditions for the LMEFW.
But note that the third LMEFW equilibrium condition, (D.4), does not
hold in an SLME. This condition arises in an LMEFWwhenmi is optimally
chosen. In the SLME, mi is not chosen optimally because it is constrained
to equal ωli.
Conditions (D.3) and (D.5) can now be used to give an explicit descrip-
tion of the SLME when (D.1) and (D.2) describe the technology and prefer-
ences respectively. We first show that, as was the case with an LME, (D.5)
determines li and ν. As noted above, (D.5) implies (D.7) which reduces
to (D.8) when (D.1) holds. Equation (D.8) can then be solved to obtain
the expression (D.9) for li which is independent of i. Thus in the SLME,
as in the LMEFW, each firm employs the same amount of labor and that
amount is, as in the LMEFW, given by equation (D.9). The number of
firms, ν, is determined by the equality of labor supply and demand. When
(D.9) holds, as it does in both the LMEFW and SLME, the supply-demand
equality is expressed by (D.10) and the number of firms is the ν value given
by (D.11). This argument establishes that there are an equal number of
firms in the SLME and the LME in this example. It is possible to make
this argument because each firm in an SLME employs the same amount of
labor as each firm in an LME. In these two respects then, the SLME and
LMEFW are the same.
We will now show that the allocation of capital is different in the two
equilibria. This occurs because mi is, in effect, restricted to equal ωli in
the SLME. Recall that mi determines a type i individual’s share of the
risk associated with a firm of type i. Thus the share which any individual
may bear of the risk associated with a firm is restricted. It is possible for
individuals to compensate for these restrictions by varying ki to increase
or decrease the risk being shared. In an LMEFW, the mi’s varied across
types as a reflection of the differences in risk aversion across types. Since
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM IN A LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMY 215
the mi’s are restricted to equal ωli in an SLME, the differences in risk
aversion across types results in differences in ki across types. In this way,
variations in the level of capital employed serve as substitutes in an SLME
for the variations in mi which are permitted in an LMEFW. In a SLME, ki
choices are thus forced to serve two purposes: they determine output and
they allocate risks. In an LMEFW, the ki choice simply determines output;
the mi choice allocates risk. Because the ki choice is only asked to perform
a single function in an LMEFW, it can do so perfectly. As a consequence,
each firm chooses the technologically efficient k value determined in (D.13).
Because the ki choice is used to determine the allocation of risk in an SLME,
the resulting ki choices are different for each i. They therefore differ from
the technologically efficient level described in (D.13).
Because the ki’s play a role in the SLME which is analogous to the role
played by mi in the LMEFW, the equilibrium SLME values of ki can now
be obtained from the analysis previously used to obtain the equilibrium
LMEFW values for mi. We first recall that (D.3) implies that (D.16) holds
for all i. In the study of the LMEFW, (D.16) was used to obtain (D.l7).
In an SLME, (D.17) is replaced by
hk
Exe−ρiωil(
kδi l
σ
s+l )x˜
Ee−ρiωil(
kδ
i
lσ
s+l )x˜
= r = hk
Exe−ρ1ω1l(
kδ1l
σ
s+l )x˜
Ee−ρ1ω1l(
kδ1l
σ
s+l )x˜
(D.23)
Equation (D.23) will hold for all i if
ρiωilk
δ
i = ρ1ω1lk
δ
1 (D.24)
holds for all i. Equation (D.24) is the SLME analog of (D.18) in the LME.
This equation can be solved for ki in terms of k1. Specifically, (D.24)
implies that
ki =
[
ρ1ω1l
ρiωil
]1/δ
k1. (D.25)
The relationship displayed in (D.25) between the SLME equilibrium val-
ues ki and k1 parallels the relationship, expressed in (D.l9), between the
LMEFW values mi and m1. Note that ki equals kj if and only if ρiωil
equals ρjωjl. Thus ki is in general different from kj . As a consequence, not
all SLME firms employ the technologically efficient capital level determined
in (D.13).
The exact amount of capital has not yet been determined, since (D.25)
only specifies how ki and k1 must be related. In order to determine k1,
we use the fact that, in equilibrium, capital supply and demand must be
equal. We must also determine the number of firms of type i. This is not
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necessary in an LME because all firms are the same; they all employ the
same amounts of capital and labor. In an SLME, in which ki is different
for each type, the labor supplied by type i workers to type i firms will be
ωliµi. If there are νi firms of type i, they will demand νi(l + s) units of
labor where l is given by (D.9). The demand for labor by type i firms will
equal the supply of labor to these firms when
νi
(
s+
σs
1− (δ + σ)
)
= ωliµi. (D.26)
Equation (D.26) implies that the equilibrium number of type i firms is
νi =
ωliµi[1− (δ + σ)]
(1− δ)s . (D.27)
Using (D.27) and (D.25), the total demand for capital is
∑
i∈I
νiki =
[1− (δ + σ)]
(1− δ)s (ρ1ω1l)
1/δk1
∑
i∈I
(
1
ρiωil
)1/δ
µiωli (D.28)
This demand can now be equated to ωk the supply of capital, and the
resulting equation can then be solved for k1. When the resulting k1 is
substituted in (D.25), the equilibrium ki value is found to equal
ki =
ωks(1− δ)
[1− (δ + σ)]
(
1
ρiωil
)1/δ [∑
t∈I
(
1
ρtωtl
)1/δ
µtωlt
]−1
. (D.29)
This ki value equals the efficient k level give in (D.13) if and only if ρiωil
equals ρjωjl for all i and j.
The description of the SLME is completed when the equilibrium r is
computed by substituting the expression for ki in (D.23).
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